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expenses, and that such determination was not subject to review or
approval by any other officer or governmental department. Bache
and Co., v. Gainer 177 S.E.2d 10 (W. Va. 1970).
In the past the Court has been somewhat reluctant to use
mandamus to coerce state officials to act because of the wide range
of discretion available to executive officials in discharging their
duties. But in recent years the Court has relaxed its views, and today
mandamus has become a popular judicial device to secure individual
rights vis-a-vis the state. See Davis, Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in W. Va. 60 W. VA. L. REv. 1, (1957). See also,
Annot., 91 A.L.R. 1497 (1934).
Criminal Law-Jurisdiction To Revoke Probation
In February, 1965, defendant represented by counsel pleaded
guilty to a charge of forgery and in March was sentenced to a term
of one to ten years in the state penitentiary. However, the sentence
was suspended and the defendant was placed on probation for three
years. Then in February, 1967, defendant pleaded guilty to a
misdemeanor and was sentenced to the county jail for six months.
The circuit court, vested with supervisory authority over the
defendant, revoked the defendant's probation and ordered him to
serve the suspended sentence in the state penitentiary. The defendant
was without counsel at the revocation of probation hearing.
In April, 1968, after the probationary period had expired, the
defendant instituted a habeas corpus proceeding in the circuit court
alleging that the revocation of his probation was unlawful and void
because he had been without counsel at the revocation of probation
hearing. The circuit court agreed, and he was released. However,
the same circuit court ordered a second revocation of probation
hearing to be conducted and at that hearing ruled that the defendant
had violated the terms of the probation. While incarcerated in the
state penitentiary, the defendant appealed this second revocation
of probation. Held, circuit court's ruling reversed. The circuit
court did not have jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation after
the period of probation had expired. State v. Shawyer, 177 S.E.2d
25 (W. Va. 1970).
In West Virginia once the probationary period has expired, a
court cannot revoke the defendant's probation. State v. Reel, 152
W.Va. 646, 165 S.E.2d 813 (1969). Generally a revocation of pro-
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bation is void if the defendant was not represented by counsel and
did not waive that right. State ex jel. Render v. Wood, 152 W.Va.
484, 165 S.E.2d 102 (1968). However, in West Virginia the court
has held in applying Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), that
revocation of probation of a defendant who was not represented by
counsel is valid if he was previously sentenced with counsel present.
State ex rel. Riffle v. Thorn, 168 S.E.2d 810 (W.Va. 1969). The
court in Shawyer did not make a determination as to whether the
circuit court had mistakenly voided the initial revocation of probation; it ruled that the decision to free the defendant was final and
irreversible by application of the principles of res judicata. The
court in Shawyer also rejected the state's contention that the second
revocation of probation was actually a continuation (seventeen
months later) of the first hearing which was held within the probationary period.
Mandamus-State Agency Reimbursement
The Attorney General, under authority of W. VA. CODE ch. 11,
art. 1, § 1 (Michie Supp. 1970), appointed assistant attorneys
general to aid the State Tax Commissioner. W. VA. CoDE ch. 11,
art. 1, § 1 (Michie Supp. 1970), and Budget Bill for 1969-70, item
17, account no. 240, require that the Attorney General be reimbused
for the use of legal counsel and secretarial help. Therefore, from
its appropriations the Tax Department remunerated the Attorney
General to the sum of $117,666.65 for those personnel appointed
from July, 1969, through February, 1970. However, the Attorney
General requested compensation of $131,538.15 and filed a writ of
mandamus to compel the Tax Commissioner to issue a requisition
upon the State Auditor for the $13,871.50 deficiency. Held, writ
denied. The Tax Commissioner is required only to reimburse the
Attorney General for those services "in an amount agreed upon by
the Attorney General and the proper authority of said spending unit."
Budget Bill for 1969-70, item 17, account no. 240. The Tax Department's expenditure schedule for its appropriations earmarked sufficient funds to compensate the Attorney General, but that did not
mean the Tax Commissioner had agreed upon an amount of reimbursement. To hold so would deny him the discretionary power of
determining the personnel needs and appropriation expenditures for
his department. Further, the petition for the writ did not allege
any agreement on the amount of remuneration to be made; thus
the Attorney General failed to show a clear legal right to the relief
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